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 AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL REPORTING: A CASE OF  
 COOPERATIVE POLICY FORMULATION 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the past two decades, the public sector both in Australia and overseas has undergone a period 
of intense change.  The focus has been on efficiency, effectiveness and value for money of public 
sector operations.  The methods by which governments account and report on their operations 
has received scrutiny.  While Treasuries and Departments of Finance in each Australian 
jurisdiction have traditionally formulated the reporting and accounting rules used in the public 
sector, since 1983, with the formation of the Public Sector Accounting Standards Board 
(PSASB), the accounting profession has become involved in the setting of accounting standards 
for the public sector.  Several researchers have suggested that a ‘contest' exists between the 
accounting profession and the government regulators for control over the public sector 
accounting standards process.  This paper explores the processes whereby the public sector in 
Australia formulates its financial reporting policies by examining the interactions between the 
PSASB and the government regulators in each of the Australian jurisdictions.  Policy community 
and policy network theory are used to argue that policy is formulated by a `cooperative' grouping 
of accounting professionals from the central agencies of Treasuries and Departments of Finance 
and the PSASB.  The paper concludes that this method of policy formulation has implications for 
the content of policy and for the access of stakeholders to the formulation of that policy.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS:  Policy formulation; Australia; Public Sector Accounting Standards Board; public 
sector financial reporting;  Departments of Finance; Treasuries 
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 AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL REPORTING: A CASE OF  
 COOPERATIVE POLICY FORMULATION 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Each jurisdiction in the Australian public sector1 has a long history of codified accounting 
practices and standards formulated by a variety of public sector bodies (such as Treasuries and 
Departments of Finance, Public Accounts Committees and Audit Offices) (Guthrie 1990:239).  
Governments in each Australian jurisdiction, through their Treasuries and Departments of 
Finance, have control over the rules used by their agencies in the preparation and reporting of 
financial results.  Further, since 1983 the Australian accounting profession has become involved 
in the formulation of financial reporting standards through the Public Sector Accounting 
Standards Board (PSASB).  The PSASB issued accounting standards AAS27 Financial 
Reporting by Local Governments in 1990, AAS29 Financial Reporting by Government 
Departments in 1993, and AAS31 Financial Reporting by Governments in 1996.  The 
fundamental change required by these professional standards is for governments to move from 
their traditional cash basis of reporting promoted by economists and determined by the 
International Monetary Fund's Government Finance Statistics (GFS) model and the United 
Nation's System of National Accounts (SNA), to an accrual basis.  There appears to be an almost 
universal adoption of accrual reporting by government departments and governments (Micallef 
1997:50).   However, in spite of the magnitude of the change to accrual reporting, there has been 
little research into these change processes in the public sector.  The sets of conditions, the 
specific events, the methods and strategies used by adherents to promote this change have been 
documented elsewhere (for example, see Ryan 1998).  The focus of this paper is to examine the 
processes whereby the public sector in Australia formulates its financial reporting policies for 
government departments and governments. 
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One of the issues raised in the public sector accounting literature is the `contest' between the 
accounting profession regulators (PSASB) and public sector regulators (Treasuries and 
Departments of Finance), for control of the policy formulation (policy making) process.  The 
interaction between these two regulatory bodies has received brief attention from Guthrie (1990), 
Walker (1989) and Parker (1993).  Guthrie (1990:243) calls for research that "would map the 
patterns and differences [in interactions] over time...the contest goes on for control over certain 
issues, knowledge and expertise".  Walker (1989:11) has argued that the Australian Accounting 
Research Foundation (AARF) through its PSASB has "control" over the public sector accounting 
standard setting process and may be too ready to promote common public sector and private 
sector standards.  Parker (1993:154) has also acknowledged the "battle" between the accounting 
profession and the public sector regulators for "control" over the financial reporting agenda.  The 
objective of this paper is to examine the role of interested parties to the standard setting process, 
in particular, this interaction between the accounting profession and the government regulators.  
As such, the focus is on how governments formulate financial reporting policy, particularly since 
the formation of the PSASB.  The paper uses a policy network framework to analyse relations 
between government and non-government actors in formulating public sector financial reporting 
policy in Australia.  The insights from this analysis enable conclusions to be drawn about the 
standard setting process as it operates in the public sector in Australia, and point to areas for 
further research. 
 4
INSIGHTS FROM PRIOR LITERATURE 
The processes surrounding the setting of accounting standards has been the subject of 
considerable discussion in the private sector for half a century.  Standard setting studies in the 
private sector have been criticised for their concentration on the interactions between 
respondents to draft accounting standards and the profession based standard setting bodies 
(Booth and Cocks 1990; Walker and Robinson 1993).  Not only do such studies fail to place the 
process of accounting standard setting in a "wider institutional and social context" (Booth and 
Cocks 1990:512), they have implicit assumptions of pluralist interests in the standard setting 
process, and they fail to recognise the interactions between profession-based standard setting 
bodies and the government regulators (Walker and Robinson 1993).  In the public sector where 
government regulators have control of the content of reporting policies, an examination of the 
interactions between government regulators and the profession based standard setting bodies 
seems to be a matter which has the potential to impact on the content of such policies. 
 
Other accounting researchers have concentrated on the institutional arrangements that regulate 
the accounting profession and its work.  There is an increasing number of ‘critical research' 
studies (Willmott 1986), which examine the relations between the state and the accountancy 
profession.  These studies use the macro theories of Marx (neo-corporatist analysis) or Weber 
(neo-pluralist analysis) to provide theoretical frameworks for the analysis conducted.2  Some 
studies concentrate on the formation of professional associations (for example, Chua and Sinclair 
1994, Chua and Poullaos 1993, Willmott 1986, Walker 1995, Walker and Shackleton 1995).  A 
fewer number of ‘critical' studies have examined the dynamics of accounting regulation and the 
‘state/profession' dynamic, by turning their attention to the formulation of policy relating to 
particular issues (for example, Willmott et al. 1992; Burchell et al. 1985).  However, one of the 
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fundamental difficulties with the existing theoretical models used is with the conceptualisation of 
interests (Chua and Poullaos 1993).  Researchers have retreated from ‘ideal-type' models which 
predetermine interests, and argued for the need to ‘follow' particular events (for example Chua 
and Poullaos 1993) in an effort to capture the ‘flavour' of individual situations.  In essence, the 
problem identified by these accounting researchers is the difficulty in transversing from the 
macro level of analysis to the meso (middle) or micro level.  
 
This problem of the marrying of different levels of analysis with theories of interests has also 
been a challenge to political scientists.  Traditional theoretical perspectives of corporatism and 
pluralism  regarded interest groups as organisations separate from government, who attempted to 
influence public policy.  However, both perspectives were perceived to have limitations.  First, 
they failed to recognise the variety of arrangements by which policy is formulated.  Second, the 
state was viewed as a holistic actor, thus failing to explain variation in policy formulation across 
different policy sectors (Atkinson and Coleman 1992:154-155).  Third, it was argued that, as 
society becomes more complex and technical, it is logical that outside groups would participate 
in the policy-making processes of government (Atkinson and Coleman 1992).  Thus, it seems 
that these problems with the macro theories of corporatism and pluralism, and their translation 
into the analysis of particular policy situations has been highlighted by both accounting 
researchers and political scientists.  Researchers in both disciplines have highlighted the 
advantages of using middle-level theories as a framework for analysis (Laughlin 1995; Coleman 
and Skogstad 1990).   
 
It is in this context that the concepts of ‘policy community' and ‘policy network' have received 
growing attention by political scientists as a tool for analysing relations between government and 
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non-government actors in formulating public policy.  Where policy network studies differ from 
pluralist and corporatist analyses is in shifting the focus of attention away from both the ‘macro' 
(or national) level of policy making and `micro' level studies (on individual organisations or 
small groups), to the ‘meso'/middle (or sectoral) level (Rhodes 1990:286).  Policy network 
scholars argue for the use of middle level theory, believing it is not sensible to work toward a 
single model of policy formulation because of the range of complex state/society relationships in 
different policy sectors (Atkinson and Coleman 1992:156).  The most prominent studies of 
policy networks have tended to focus on explaining relations between state and society actors in 
particular industry sectors (see for example Wilks and Wright 1987; Atkinson and Coleman 
1989; Coleman and Skogstad 1990).  Research both overseas and in Australia has demonstrated 
the usefulness of the policy network approach (for example see Homeshaw 1995 for an 
explanation of the development of science policy in Australia, and Coleman and Skogstad 1990 
for accounts of banking policy, farm policy, forestry policy and health policy in Canada).  It is 
with this background that the policy network framework is explored as a useful analytical 
framework for examining the formulation of public sector financial reporting policy in Australia. 
 
POLICY NETWORK FRAMEWORK 
The early work of researchers such as Heclo (1978) and Richardson and Jordan (1979), asserted 
that policy was made by the interaction between government actors, particularly bureaucratic 
actors, and groups of actors outside the government.  These early writers used the term ‘issue 
community'.  Today, the terms ‘policy community' and ‘policy network' have gained wide 
acceptance.  The commonly accepted view is that the term ‘policy community' refers to the 
actors who share a common identity or interest and ‘policy network' refers to the relationships 
that bind the actors (Wilks and Wright 1987; Coleman and Skogstad 1990; Atkinson and 
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Coleman 1992).   
 
A ‘policy community' consists of all actors or potential actors who share a common "policy 
focus", whether they have a direct or indirect interest in a policy area, and who, with varying 
degrees of influence shape policy outcomes over the long run (Coleman and Skogstad 1990:25).  
The total population of the community extends to Parliament and its committees, political parties 
and the media, as well as the bureaucrats in government and groups outside the public sector 
(Wright 1988).  In recognition of the differing role that various actors play in the community, 
some writers, for example Pross (1986) and Kingdon (1984), divide policy communities into 
groups.  Kingdon (1984), describes the two groups as the ‘visible cluster' and ‘hidden cluster'.  
This division and these terms is useful for analytical purposes and will be used in this paper.   
 
The visible cluster is the group of actors who operate to affect political decision makers.  They 
have the ability to "receive a lot of press and public attention" (Kingdon 1984:72).  The visible 
cluster is not a tightly knit group but still plays a vital role in the policy process.  They contribute 
to the gradual process through which policies and programs are expressed, amended, extended 
and adapted by maintaining “a perpetual policy-review process”.  Their greatest influence is on 
long-range policy.  They do not contribute to detailed policy formulation as they do not have the 
day-to-day access to the key policy agency in the hidden cluster and therefore this limits their 
influence (Pross 1986:152).  In the Australian context, Parliament and its legislative and 
oversight bodies, credit rating agencies and audit commissions form the ‘visible cluster' which 
operates to shape the long term policy direction.   
 
On the other hand, the hidden cluster is the group of institutional actors which forms the core of 
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each policy community and is the policy-making body in the field.  These actors operate more 
from behind the scenes and with less direct public accountability than the visible cluster.  The 
hidden cluster consists of state agencies and institutionalised interest groups (Pross 1986:99).3  
The state agency, or lead agency (Pross 1986:137) sits at the centre of the policy community.  
The lead agency (or agencies) usually possess a monopoly of technical capacity within the public 
sector relating to a specific policy field, and thus, often dominates policy advice to the executive 
(Pross 1986:137).  Institutionalised interest groups also form part of the hidden cluster.  Securing 
a recognised position in the hidden cluster is the major priority for any outside group seeking to 
influence policy (Pross 1986:145).  Admission to the circle in the hidden cluster is recognition of 
the policy capacity of the interest group and gives the ability to include or exclude certain issues 
on the policy agenda.  Only institutionalised agencies with substantial resources can manage the 
day-to-day communication with the key government agency; the invitations to comment on draft 
policy; and the invitations to sit on advisory committees that being a member of the hidden 
cluster entails (Pross 1986:98; Bell 1992:109). Using this analysis, in the Australian public 
sector, the lead agency for financial reporting in each of the Australian jurisdictions, is the central 
agencies of Treasuries and Departments of Finance.  Further, within each of these agencies, there 
are accounting policy units--sections, branches or departments of the central agency in which 
trained accountants formulate and coordinate financial reporting policy for public sector agencies 
(Ryan forthcoming).  Hence, these units are the key lead agencies in the financial reporting 
domain.  The main interest group concerned with financial reporting policy formulation is the 
PSASB. 
 
While ‘policy community' describes the actors with an interest in policy formulation, the term 
‘policy network' refers to the links between members of one policy community or the links 
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between different policy communities, that is, the relationships among the actors and the patterns 
of interaction that surround an issue (Wilks and Wright 1987; Bell 1992; Coleman and Skogstad 
1990:26).  Not all policy communities form policy networks.  Relationships between members 
may be so unstructured that no stable network of resources dependencies is discernible.  Policy 
communities will only generate policy networks if there are issues and problems which provide 
the occasion for this to happen, and if there is a structured and stable network of resource 
dependencies between the actors in the policy community (Wright 1988:606).   
 
The policy network concept implies that both the bureaucracy and interest groups are "allies" and 
"partners" in the policy process (Hughes 1994:223-224; Wright 1988:604).  There is an "active 
partnership" where both parties need each other, and both parties influence, and are influenced 
by each other (Hughes 1994:232; Coleman and Skogstad 1990:313).  Although a policy network 
maps the relationships between the various actors in the hidden cluster, and indicates the broad 
framework of interdependency within which policy is formulated, it does not imply that the 
contribution of each of the groups to policy formulation is equal.  Further, it does not mean the 
end of disagreements between the groups.  Conflicts may arise frequently over particular policy 
proposals (Wright 1988:598).  As Grant (1989:31) has stated, the relationships between the 
groups in the hidden cluster are "sometimes in conflict, often in agreement, but always in touch 
and operating within a shared framework".   
 
Policy networks can be identified and characterised along a number of dimensions: membership 
itself; the interests of members; the extent of interdependence between members; and the 
isolation of the network from other networks (Wright 1988:607).  Networks can be classified 
according to their level of integration.  A ‘highly integrated' network is characterised by resource 
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dependencies; a stability and restriction of membership; and an inter-dependence between 
members who share responsibility for both initiating policy and for policy formulation (Wright 
1988:607).  
 
In summary, the policy community and policy network concepts provide a framework to analyse 
the actual dynamics of relations between the PSASB and the accounting policy units of the 
Treasuries and Departments of Finance.   However, while the literature gives some broad 
characteristics of these arrangements, the exact character of policy communities and the network 
which binds them, and the implications for policy content, can only be settled by empirical 
examination (Considine 1994:127; Wright 1988:595).  It is the identification of the type of policy 
network that surrounds Australian public sector financial reporting for government departments 
and governments that is the focus of this article. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES 
Studies of the processes of policy formulation favour particular methodologies.  Explanations are 
being sought for ‘what' happened, ‘how' events happened, and ‘why' certain policies were made. 
 An examination of documentary evidence, both published and unpublished, is useful because it 
tends to describe ‘what' happened and to give some indications as to ‘how' events happened.  In 
addition, the technique of ‘elite interviewing' (interviews of key persons  in the policy 
community) has been found useful by policy network scholars (Coleman and Skogstad 1990:2), 
to supplement historical data, and give further insights into ‘how' and ‘why' certain policies were 
made.   
 
The documentary evidence used in this study comprises published reports of inter-governmental 
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working parties, reports of audit commissions, and unpublished records and minutes of 
proceedings of the Standing Treasury Liaison Committee from 1992 to 1994.  Interviews of key 
actors in the Australian public sector financial reporting policy community were conducted 
between December 1992 and June 1993.  The twenty-five interviewees were targeted and 
preselected because they held senior positions in government and the profession, and were 
considered as being active players in promoting changes to financial reporting policies in 
government.4  In general, the selection of interviewees was influenced by their being identified as 
a member who had enough influence to shape policy outcomes over the long run.  Four groups 
were identified as being influential;  Auditors-General,5 accounting policy officers,6 chairs of 
PSASB,7 representatives from the Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF).8 
 
Table I summarises the interviews undertaken. 
 
TABLE I HERE 
 
Interview participants represented all States,9 the Northern Territory and the Commonwealth of 
Australia.  To maintain the anonymity of interviewees they are not cited by name in the text of 
the paper.  
 
The validity of the data sources warrants consideration.  The documentary evidence is a 
permanent record made by committees.   As such, it needs no further verification, and can be 
interpreted accordingly.  However, it often records ‘what’ happened, but not ‘why’, and ‘how’.  
To penetrate this dimension, interviews are useful.  The advantage of using interview material is 
to "supplement and clarify the written record or provide a record where no written record exists" 
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(Collins and Bloom 1991:23).  The main problem in using interviews is that the respondent can 
fail to report fully and there may be interviewer error.  To attempt to overcome this possible bias, 
the interview material in this study is used in two ways.  First, it reinforces perspectives from 
other sources, that is, it rounds out the narrative (Weller 1989:xvi).  Second, it gives access to 
material not recorded.  This is of special significance where policy formulation occurs in a 
relatively small ‘hidden cluster' of actors.  Interview material is used to obtain a perspective of 
different groups of actors.  Thus, as Weller (1989:xvi), comments, as "more and more people 
provide a similar picture, as instances or impressions are checked against each other and against 
the official record, so they may be regarded as more reliable and accurate". 
 
A POLICY NETWORK SURROUNDING FINANCIAL REPORTING 
The theoretical literature on policy networks argues that networks can be classified according to 
their structural characteristics.  Wright (1988:607), argues that a ‘highly integrated' network is 
characterised by resource dependencies; an inter-dependence between members who share 
responsibility for both initiating policy and for policy formulation; and a stability and restriction 
of membership.  These three characteristics will be used to analyse whether a policy network 
exists in the case of financial reporting in Australia. 
 
Resource dependencies 
By the early 1990s most jurisdictions were applying ‘managerialist' techniques.10  Governments 
in all jurisdictions were placing an emphasis on the efficiency and effectiveness of operations 
and the measurement of costs of operations.  Accrual techniques were promoted for use at the 
agency and whole of government levels (Shand 1990).  However, as Walker (1988:80) argues, 
the introduction of these techniques was not as simple as the rhetoric seemed to indicate.  Public 
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sector accounting standards were piecemeal, lacked widespread support and were not 
enforceable.  Faced with this situation, the Treasuries could have produced their own ‘rules', or 
turned to the accounting profession for their support.  The changes occurring in the public sector 
during the 1980s and 1990s meant that it may have been in the interests of the accounting policy 
officers in the Treasuries and Departments of Finance to promote professionally derived rules.  
An analysis of the unstructured responses to the interview question ‘Comment on what you 
believe is the ideal mechanism (the most efficient and effective way) for setting accounting 
standards for the public sector', revealed that each accounting policy officer believed accounting 
standards should be set outside the public sector. 
 
Four reasons have been advanced in the literature, and reinforced in the interviews, as to why 
actors in the public sector might look outside their own ranks for cooperation in policy 
formulation. First, some writers argue that individual groups of actors in the public sector favour 
identification with a professional group because of the professional enhancement it brings to 
their positions.  Cochrane (1993:34) argues that professionals derive an “important source of 
power” from this identification.  As one accounting policy officer (interview 1993) noted: 
 
 There is a belief among accounting policy people that we should have national 
standards, they want that professional aspect.  
Further evidence in support of this reason came from another accounting policy officer 
(interview 1993) who noted: 
 Bureaucrats want to be professional…they are pushing their profession of financial accounting 
forward to get out from underneath other layers of professions who have always controlled them 
and limited what they could do. 
 
 
Second, others argue that the profession is the more appropriate place to set professional 
standards, as these standards are then less likely to be open to ‘political manipulation'.  It is 
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argued that the use of groups outside the public sector to formulate policy adds a “credibility” to 
policy (Vict. Com. 1993:195).  As one accounting policy (interview 1993) noted "we are trying 
to keep the politicians honest".  Another  suggested: 
 
 If we are going to attract professional people into Treasuries, we have to be able to say that your 
work, the way you measure something, is going to be based on a professional standard and must 
not be subject to political direction…it is too easy for Treasuries to become instruments of 
politics. 
 
Third, others argue that if policies are formulated outside the public sector, this assists central 
agencies in their task of  ‘selling' the policy to line agencies.  As Hughes (1994:226) notes, 
“outside interest groups are a decided asset, so much so that they will be encouraged by the 
bureaucracy to assist it in its struggle with other agencies".  The views of Treasury personnel 
were summed up by one accounting policy officer (interview 1993) who stated: 
 
 there are some benefits if standards come out of the profession...we can argue we have 
no vested interest in the outcome when selling it to departments, 
and an AARF representative (interview 1993) who stated: 
 
 The Treasuries are looking for rules, and those rules they have to pass on to their 
constituents and they are far more palatable if the rules come from an outside body...so 
you have got the resources issue plus the independence issue, and so they prefer the 
PSASB to do it [develop accounting standards]. 
The fourth reason advanced is that with the increasing complexity of policy domains, it is more 
efficient and often cheaper, if groups interested in policy formulation cooperate in the process 
(Wilson 1992:81).  It is further contended that in a complex technical area, it is a logical 
development for a dependency to form between those actors in a particular policy domain who 
are in frequent contact (Atkinson and Coleman 1992:157; Pross 1986:132; Grant 1989:31).  As 
one accounting policy officer (interview 1993) noted: 
 
 [the PSASB] does good long term research.  We don't have the time to do that because 
 15
we are more practically oriented. 
Another accounting policy officer (interview 1993) commented: 
 
 we [the Treasuries] have got enough to do, and we prefer someone else to do it...the 
issue of duplication of resources is relevant. 
 
The central agencies recognised the resources (both in terms of time and money) needed to 
formulate policy in this new and technically complex area.  In summary, accountants in the 
accounting policy units saw advantages in the formulation of accounting standards by a body 
outside the public sector.  With these motivations the public sector commenced funding the 
PSASB (Chair PSASB interview, 1993).  Public sector funding of the PSASB was only meant to 
be temporary and was aimed at expediting work in order to get a standard on departments.  The 
arrangement was for funding to be provided for an initial three year term (from the beginning of 
1990 to the end of 1992), although all jurisdictions have continued to fund the PSASB beyond 
this first triennium (W P on Merger 1992:35; Accounting policy officers interviews 1993).11 
 
Public sector funding represented approximately 25% of the total PSASB funding in the 1990-92 
triennium (W P on Merger 1992:31).  The stated aim of this funding was to allow the PSASB to 
devote more resources to public sector work.  Included in the output of the PSASB to 1996 was 
the production of six specific public sector policy documents.  Three concerned Reporting by 
Government Departments: Discussion Paper No. 16 (Sutcliffe et al. 1991) produced in April 
1991; Exposure Draft 55 (AARF 1992) produced in January 1992 and AAS29 (AARF 1993) 
produced in December 1993.  Three concerned Reporting by Governments:  Discussion Paper 
No. 21 (Micallef et al. 1994), Exposure Draft 62 (AARF 1995) produced in March 1995 and 
AAS31 (AARF 1996) produced in November 1996. 
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While it is difficult to attribute specific output to the funding by the public sector, the crucial 
effect is that funding provided resource dependencies between the two policy formulation 
bodies, and this had the effect of facilitating closer cooperation between the bodies.  Table II 
summarises the opinions of the accounting policy officers (APO) as to the effect of funding 
arrangements for the PSASB.12   
 
TABLE II HERE 
 
Table II indicates that 87.5% of the accounting policy officers felt that at least one of the 
outcomes of funding was that it brought them into the process of standard setting.  As one 
accounting policy officer (interview 1993), noted "funding changed the whole nature of the 
game.  Treasuries became part of the process."  Another commented "it has helped people to get 
together and establish a network". 
 
This data provides some evidence of the network being created between the PSASB and the 
central agencies through resource dependencies.  There are, though, other indicators.  As Wright 
(1988:607) has indicated, a ‘highly integrated’ network is characterised by an interdependence 
between members who share responsibility for both initiating policy and for policy formulation’. 
 
Inter-dependence between members for policy formulation 
There are two pieces of evidence for the interdependence between the PSASB and the 
accounting policy officers on policy formulation: first, the development of the PSASB work 
program; and second, collaboration on policy issues.  The first way in which the central agencies 
were brought into the policy formulation process was through having a direct input into the work 
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program of the PSASB.  From 1989 yearly meetings were held between the PSASB and the 
accountants from the accounting policy units.   The work program of the PSASB was discussed.  
Opinions as to the source of the work program of the PSASB can be seen in Table III.13  The data 
in Table III indicates that the majority of respondents felt that the work program of the PSASB 
was the result of a consultative process and that the accounting policy officers had a direct input 
into the agenda of the Board.  The large undecided response rate by the auditors-general is 
explained by the fact that these respondents claimed they could not answer the question because 
they were not close enough to the process.  This indicates that as a group, auditors-general are 
not involved in detailed policy formulation, and operate far more as ‘external' political review 
agents and as members of the ‘visible cluster'.  This reinforces the next theoretical tenet to be 
discussed, that the formation of a policy network implies a closed form of policy-making, 
effectively isolating groups external to the network (Wright 1988:608).  Further evidence of the 
influence of accounting policy officers on the PSASB's work program is obtained by examining 
one of the PSASB's projects, namely, financial reporting by governments.  At the November 
1991 joint meeting between the PSASB and the accounting policy officers, this project was 
given a relatively low priority (PSASB progress report 1991).  However, during 1992, 
accountants in the policy units subsequently became aware of the ramifications that definitions 
contained in the Exposure Draft 55 Financial Reporting by Government Departments, would 
have on policy documents on Reporting by Governments.  Thus, at the 1992 joint meeting 
between the PSASB and accounting policy officers, the policy officers suggested that the priority 
of the reporting by government project be elevated.  It received top priority on the PSASB work 
program for 1993 (PSASB Progress Report 1993; Chair PSASB interview).  
 
The second piece of evidence for the interdependence between the PSASB and the accounting 
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policy officers comes from their collaboration on policy issues. While the individual accounting 
policy officers from the various jurisdictions had previously supplied technical input on both the 
Discussion Paper No. 16 Financial Reporting by Government Departments, and the resultant 
exposure draft (ED 55), this input had not been given in a coordinated manner as there was no 
formal mechanism existing between the accounting policy officers in the individual jurisdictions. 
 The formation of the Standing Treasuries Liaison Committee (STLC)14 in October 1992 
provided this coordination mechanism and an opportunity for the PSASB to obtain joint 
feedback from all jurisdictions on the contents of their policies.  It was agreed that the 
penultimate draft of the standard on Reporting by Government Departments would be forwarded 
to the STLC for review and comment.  This draft was circulated at the February 1993 meeting of 
the STLC.  The AARF was keen to issue a final standard and pressed the STLC for comments to 
facilitate an April 30 issue of the standard.  However, the STLC had other items that needed to 
be attended to for the Heads of Treasuries, and did not get to discuss Exposure Draft 55.  
However, the STLC brought its August meeting forward to 27 July 1993 in order to consider 
ED55.  After further adjustment, the final standard was issued in December 1993. 
 
A similar collaboration on policy formulation can be observed in relation to the Reporting by 
Governments project.  The network formed between the PSASB and the STLC meant that the 
STLC was able to be used in a more systematic manner than had been possible with the 
government department project.  The STLC's input was obtained from the outset on this project.  
The members of the STLC at the time acted as the Project Advisory Panel for the Discussion 
Paper.  Indeed, the authors of the Discussion Paper were keen to obtain the ‘consensus views’ of 
the STLC before issuing the Discussion Paper (STLC Minutes 1993).  Further, at all stages in the 
writing of the Exposure Draft, the AARF worked closely with the STLC (STLC minutes 1994). 
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The PSASB released Exposure Draft 62 (AARF 1995), in March 1995 and the comment period 
ended in June 1995.  A standard was due to be issued in December 1995.  However, the Heads of 
Treasuries requested the PSASB to delay the issuance of the standard for six months while some 
trial statements were prepared by certain jurisdictions (Micallef 1997:50).  
 
These processes surrounding the formulation of accounting standards reveal the interdependence, 
the mutual dependency, though not total agreement, between the STLC and the PSASB.  The 
PSASB realises the importance of obtaining the central agencies' support for public sector 
standards and has shown a willingness to compromise on possible problems with standards.  For 
its part, the STLC, as representative of the accounting policy arm of the Treasuries and 
Departments of Finance has become a vital part of the policy formulation process of the PSASB. 
 Moreover, while the two bodies are co-dependent in a policy sense, institutional structures have 
been built between these two groups.  The chair of the STLC has an observer status on the 
PSASB and AARF representatives have observer status on the STLC.  The STLC and the 
PSASB had become `partners' in policy formulation. 
 
While resource dependencies and the inter-dependence between members for policy formulation 
provide strong evidence that a policy network has formed around accrual reporting, further 
evidence can be seen from the stability of the membership of the network. 
 
Stability and restriction of membership 
There have been a number of advisory committees which have dealt with accounting policy 
issues; the Industries Commission Subcommittee on National Performance Monitoring of 
Government Trading Enterprises, the Accrual Accounting Working Party, the STLC, and the 
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Working Party established to examine the merger of the PSASB with the AASB.15  An analysis 
of the personnel of each of the working parties and those who attended the regular meetings 
between the PSASB and the accountants from the central agencies is contained in Table IV.  It 
indicates that many of the same personnel were involved in these committees.  The theoretical 
literature indicates that one of the characteristics of a policy network is an exclusive and closed 
membership (Kingdon 1984; Pross 1986; Wright 1988).  Table IV indicates that there is 
predominantly the same personnel attending the majority of these working parties. The 
significance of this network sustained by the working parties of officials is summed up by one 
accounting policy officer (interview 1993) who noted:  
 
 One thing that has happened is that there has been a closer working relationship with the 
AARF through the working parties...having the members from AARF has brought us 
closer to the standard setting process and that has heightened our interest, so the 
accountants in central agencies can have more influence over the outcomes. 
 
Another accounting policy officer (interview 1993) suggested that: 
 
 the closer relationship largely came about because of all of the working parties that have 
been formed, and because the same people are on them, and we see them all the time, it 
is easier to ring someone up.  A relationship has been built up because of this 
familiarity...most of us feel it is in our interests to talk to AARF.  It is easier now. 
 
 
While this exclusive and closed group of actors is further indication of the existence of a policy 
network (Kingdon 1984; Pross 1986; Wright 1988), it also serves to illustrate the closed form of 
policy formulation.  Access to the policy making process is restricted largely to groups inside the 
policy network.  As Shand  (1992:2) has observed: 
 
 The accounting profession has not been talking sufficiently to those involved in public sector.  
Likewise, these budgeters have not taken sufficient notice of work being done by the accounting 
profession on public sector accounting standards. 
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Moreover, a member of the PSASB (interview 1993), noted the same trend: 
 
 [the Board] has been too isolated, we should have been working much more with the ABS, the 
economists, the budgeting people…mind you, this is very good with hindsight…and very hard to 
do when you are developing something.  You need to be focussed. 
 
In summary, using the characteristics outlined in the theoretical literature, it has been argued that 
an integrated policy network exists between the accounting policy officers in Treasuries and the 
PSASB.  Further confirmation of a mutually dependent policy network, and of the evolution of 
this policy network can be gained from an examination of comments of the commissions of audit 
held in the various jurisdictions. 
 
In the first Commission of Audit in NSW in 1988 (NSW Com. 1988), while accounting and 
financial management issues were one focus, the PSASB received no mention at all.  The 
conclusion could be drawn that, at the time of the report, there were no links between the 
accountants in the Treasuries and the PSASB.  In comparison to the lack of recognition in the 
NSW report, four years later, the Victorian (1992) and Western Australian (1993) Commission 
reports relied heavily on the PSASB in the area of accrual reporting.16  The Victorian Audit 
Commission (Nicholls 1992), described the reporting framework of the Victorian government as 
being governed by legislation, convention and: 
 
 by accounting standards developed by the Public Sector Accounting Standards Board 
and, where no PSASB standard exists, by individual standards developed in state 
Treasuries (Nicholls 1992:85). 
 
Further, this report recommended that the preparation of consolidated financial statements should 
be in a format consistent with Australian Accounting Standards and Concepts rather than the 
economic concepts in Government Finance Statistics (GFS) statements (Nicholls 1992:76). 
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Likewise, the Western Australian Report openly acknowledged the work of the PSASB.  It noted 
(WA Com. 1993:153): 
 
 The Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (PSASB), working in conjunction with 
the States, has made considerable progress in the development of standards for 
departmental and whole-of-government reporting.  A final standard on the financial 
reporting of agencies is expected to be released within the next few months. 
 
and further, in the event of inconsistency between the Board's recommendations and Treasury 
policy: 
 
 A decision will need to be made in relation to the treatment and accountability of 
"residual" transactions and this should be consistent with the views of the PSASB when 
they are released (WA Com. 1993:155). 
 
By 1996 the role of the PSASB in the policy formulation network was uncontested.  This is 
attested by the Queensland Audit Commission's statement (Qld Com.) that the accounting 
standards presently applying in the public sector are formulated by the PSASB and that the 
PSASB were willing to review the requirements of the whole of government reporting standard 
to accommodate problems of Treasury officers (Qld Com. 1996:Vol.1:47). 
 
By 1996, the expertise of the PSASB (and its secretariat AARF) was recognised in the public 
sector.  There was a `highly integrated' and durable policy network between the accountants in 
the central agencies of Treasuries and Departments of Finance and the PSASB.  Interactions 
occurred within an institutionalised framework and the two groups were jointly in control of the 
agenda.  They were now financially and structurally linked, and commanded influence in the 
formulation of policy governing financial reporting in the public sector. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLICY NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 
Having argued that a policy network does exist for financial reporting in the Australian 
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public sector, this section will examine the implications of this: first, for the policy network 
theory; second, for the theory concerning the state/profession relationships; and third, for the 
standard setting processes in the Australian public sector. 
 
A policy network analysis has been promoted in the public policy literature as a useful tool 
for analysing policy formulation in complex, technical areas.  It implies that both the 
bureaucracy and interest groups are “partners” in the policy process (Hughes 1994:223-224). 
 Its usefulness as an analytical model has been demonstrated here in the case of Australian 
public sector financial reporting. This middle range theory has allowed an analysis of the 
processes inherent in the formulation of financial reporting policies for government 
departments and governments in the Australian public sector.  Further, the  usefulness of the 
theory goes beyond this paper, because it also contains implications of particular policy 
formulation processes for policy content and access of stakeholders to policy forums.  As 
such it provides a platform for future research.   
 
The analysis also has implications for the accounting work concerning the state/profession 
relationships.  Previous accounting studies focussing on the state/profession relationships 
have identified the problem of transversing from the macro theories of neo-corporatism or 
neo-pluralism to the specifics of individual situations.  This means that researchers have 
retreated from ‘ideal-type’ models which predetermine interests, and conducted research on 
almost a case by case basis. The policy network framework allowed a ‘middle range’ analysis 
of the interdependencies between policy actors, and the nature of the public sector financial 
reporting policy making process in Australia. The advantage of using a network analysis is 
that it does not predetermine the interests of the parties but provides a means of analysing the 
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actions of key parties involved at a sufficiently aggregated level to allow key relationships to 
be identified and examined, while still allowing for the richness and specifics of each case to 
be explored.  As such it caters for the variation that exists in policy formulation across 
different policy sectors (Atkinson and Coleman 1992: 154-155. It would be a useful 
analytical device to analyse the dynamics of policy formulation in the accounting standard 
setting process in other policy settings. 
 
The analysis also has some implications for the Australian public sector accounting standard 
setting process.  The identification of a policy network existing in a particular area, is crucial 
because the process of policy formulation does have an effect on the content of policies and the 
access of others outside the network to input to those policies (Davis et al. 1992:144-145).  
Negotiations over policy content tend to be carried out between institutional actors within a 
common policy paradigm.  The shared language, values, attitudes and beliefs of the policy actors 
‘shape' policy content and reflect the ideas of those with vested interests (Considine 1994:49,61; 
Kingdon 1984:126; Wright 1988:609; Jordan 1990:472).  Furthermore, the formation of a policy 
network implies a closed form of policy-making, effectively isolating groups external to the 
network.  Membership of the network is closed and tends to be continuous (Wright 1988:608).  
Access to the policy making process is restricted largely to groups inside the policy network.  
Policy issues are managed within the network, on the "basis of trust and a respect for 
confidence", and consultation takes place on an informal basis with an expectation that all parties 
will be included in the consultation.  `Routine' policy issues are handled within the network, and 
are "seldom successfully challenged by dissident members of the policy community" (Pross 
1986:107).  Moreover, not only do other policy networks have little actual knowledge of what is 
decided within these arrangements, governments and departments themselves who may have to 
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implement the policies being developed, also have little input to what is being decided.  The 
policy network becomes a "protective device, limiting rather than expanding the opportunities 
for the public at large to achieve major policy changes" (Pross 1986:107).  It follows from this 
view that those with access to these insular policy forums have a major influence on how policies 
change over time.  Their goal often becomes "to keep policy-making at the routine or technical 
level, thereby minimizing [political] interference" (Pross 1986:107).  Once policy formulation is 
taken out of the control of the network and resolved at political levels, the policy community and 
the policy are often vastly altered (Pross 1986:107).  These issues can again only be decided by 
further research.  Case studies of the exact policy formulation processes surrounding ED 55 
(Reporting by Government Departments) and ED 62 (Reporting by Governments) should be 
carried out to identify the effect of policy formulation processes on policy content and policy 
input. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
This study has examined the processes whereby financial reporting policy was initially 
formulated for government departments and governments in Australia.  It was argued that 
financial reporting policy formulation occurs in policy communities, within the 
institutionalised relationships between governments, state bureaucracies and organised 
interest groups.  A network has been created between the accounting professionals in central 
agencies, members of the PSASB and Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) 
personnel.  There is an ‘active partnership' where both parties need each other and both 
parties influence and are influenced by each other.  Detailed policy formulation was made by 
this small tightly knit group.  This evidences a major change in the policy formulation 
processes for financial reporting by public sector agencies in Australia.  Financial reporting 
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policy, once formulated by economists in Treasuries and Departments of Finance, now 
appears to be set by a coherent grouping of accounting professionals from both the public 
sector and the accounting profession.  However, the dynamics of policy communities change 
over time, as new issues arise and political circumstances and personalities change.  The 
dynamics between these members of the policy community need to continue to be mapped to 
determine whether this ‘active partnership’ continues over time, or the power relationships 
are challenged by emerging issues. 
 
The findings of this research have highlighted the need for future research.  Potentially, two main 
areas exist.  First, the approach could be replicated in other policy settings.  This paper has used 
the policy network approach and identified a ‘highly integrated’ network surrounding the 
formulation of financial reporting for government departments and governments.  This theory 
could be used to identify the policy community which exists in the case of local government; and 
to establish the type of network which exists, ie whether it is highly integrated or largely 
unstructured.  The second area for research which would prove fruitful concerns the content of 
the policies being formulated and the access of stakeholders to input on those policies.  The 
policy network theory does provide indications of the implications for policy formed under this 
approach.  Policy formed in networks tends to limit policy agendas, and isolates groups external 
to the network.  In the case of reporting by governments and government departments, while the 
central agencies of Treasuries and Departments of Finance have had a substantial input into the 
content of policies, the method of policy formulation may have stifled input from other interested 
parties to the process, in particular, from those in the agencies implementing these techniques.  
Given the major changes which have occurred in financial reporting in the public sector, and the 
lack of sustained debate on the effect of the introduction of accrual accounting into the public 
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sector, future case studies on  particular standards (specifically Exposure Draft 55 and Exposure 
Draft 62), to ‘map' the dynamics of the process, and the access of stakeholders would be fruitful 
and would provide further insights into the policy formulation process.   
 ENDNOTES 
 
1.This is comprised of six states, two territories and one national government. 
2.Pluralism emphasises the constraints imposed on the state by a wide range of groups and 
maintains that public policy is a reflection of the preferences of these groups.  Under pluralism, 
no single group has power and public policy results from interest group competition.  
Corporatism emphasises the constraints imposed on the state by a small range of groups and 
maintains that public policy is a reflection of the preferences of these groups (Davis et al. 
1988:25-26).   
3.Pross (1986:99) also suggests it may include academics and researchers to the extent they are 
key players.  
4.Nineteen of the interviews were conducted on a face-to-face basis.  The remaining six 
interviews were conducted by telephone in order to reduce travelling costs.   
5.In addition to the eight Auditors-General, two jurisdictions had audit policy officers who 
advised their respective Auditors-General on audit issues. 
6.Accounting policy officers are professionally trained accountants employed in Treasuries or 
Departments of Finance who have the responsibility for detailed financial reporting policy 
formulation.  They are the main actors in the lead agency in the financial reporting hidden 
cluster. 
7.The four chairpersons from 1983 to 1995 were interviewed.  
8.Three representatives from AARF; the current Director, the Director at the time the PSASB 
was formed and the Assistant Director who had been working with the PSASB from 1983 to mid 
1993 were interviewed.   
 
9.The ACT was not included in the study. 
10.`Managerialism' has been described as the promotion of private sector methodologies within 
the public sector to improve efficiencies and effectiveness of public sector operations (Davis et 
al. 1992:43). 
11.South Australia withdrew funding for the 1993 year. 
12.These opinions were gained from an analysis of the unstructured responses by the accounting 
policy officers (APO) to the question `What has been the effect or influence of the funding 
arrangements for the Board?'. 
 
13.This table was obtained from an analysis of the responses to the question `Is the determination 
of the work program the result of a consultative process with the Treasuries?  SA  A  U  D  SD'.  
14 The STLC was formed at the Heads of Treasuries meeting on 17 March, 1992. The STLC 
  
28
   
29
comprised nine members, one member from each jurisdiction and three observers, one from 
AARF, one from the National Audit Office, and one from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
 The chair rotated yearly.  The members were the accounting policy officers in each of the 
jurisdictions.  Its aim was to facilitate the interchange of accounting and reporting 
information, and policy development work between jurisdictions (W P on Acc. Accg. 
1992:22). 
 
15.A Working Party to examine a proposal to combine the PSASB and the AASB was convened 
by the Attorney General in mid 1992.  The basis of public sector representation on this Working 
Party was that the PSASB had one representative and all jurisdictions (with the exception of 
South Australia and the ACT at their choice) had one representative each (W P on Merger 1992). 
16.At the time of the 1992 Victorian Commission, the Victorian Government had already 
committed itself, in October 1991, to the application of accrual accounting for the budget sector. 
 However, no such commitment had been made by Western Australia (Nicholls 1992:74).  The 
PSASB had produced Discussion Paper No. 16 Financial Reporting by Government 
Departments (in April 1991), and Exposure Draft 55 (in January 1992). 
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Table I Interviews with key policy actors  
 
 Cwlth NSW Vic. Qld NT SA Tas. WA Total 
Auditors-General 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Accounting policy 
officers 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
Chairs PSASB         4 
Representatives 
from AARF 
        3 
Total 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 25 
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Table II Effect of PSASB funding 
 
 Accounting 
Policy Officers 
 % No. 
Claim that APO brought into standard setting process 87.5 (7) 
No claim that APO brought into standard setting process  12.5 (1) 
Total 100.0 (8) 
 
Source: Interview question 
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Table III Consultation between the PSASB and Treasuries or Departments of Finance on 
work program 
 
  
 Acc. Pol. 
Off. 
Audit 
Reps. 
Chair 
PSASB 
AARF 
Reps. 
Total 
 % No. % No. % No. % No. % No.
Strongly 
Agree 
 
25 
 
(2) 
 
0 
 
(0) 25 (1) 100 (3) 24 (6)
Agree 75 (6) 40 (4) 75 (3) 0 (0) 52 (13)
Undec'd 0 (0) 60 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 24 (6)
Disagree 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
0 
 
(0) 
 
0 
 
(0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Total 100 (8) 100 (10) 100 (4) 100 (3) 100 (25)
 
Source: Interview questionnaire. 
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Table IV Members common to multiple working parties  
 
Personnel W P on 
Acc. 
Accg. 
GTE 
Sub 
Comm 
STLC Merger 
W Pa 
Meetings 
with 
PSASB 
COMMONWEALTH      
George Carter  *  *  *  * * 
Tony Lawson (GTE Team)   *    
Ian McPhee  *    * 
Alan Pearson  *     
Russell Chantler (ANAO)    *(obs)   
QUEENSLAND      
Graham Carpenter   *       *c * 
Bob Shead  *   *  * * 
Tim Bale   *    
Peter Dann (GOE Unit)   *    
NEW SOUTH WALES      
Thuy Mellor  *  *   * 
John Chan Sew   *  *  * 
Bob Scullion  *    *  
VICTORIA      
Mike Hogan   *    
Richard May  *    * 
Phyllis Kaylis/Ron Paice    *   
Steve Black     *  
TASMANIA      
Peter Williams  *  *  *  * * 
Heather Wilson  *     
SOUTH AUSTRALIA      
Frank McGuinness  *  *  *  b  
WESTERN AUSTRALIA     * 
Neville Smith  *  *  *  *  
Doug Tyler  *     
NORTHERN TERRITORY      
Mick Martin   *  *  * * 
Irene Barry  *     
AUST. CAPITAL TERRITORY      
Rex Hollier  *  *  * b * 
Ian Downes  *    b * 
AARF      
Warren McGregor  *  *  *(obs)  * 
Jim Paul   *   * 
Paul Sutcliffe  *    * 
AUST. BUREAU STATISTICS      
Don Efford  *   *(obs)   
 
Sources: W P on Acc. Accg. (1992) Attachment E; W P on Merger (1993:34); Steering Com. (1993) Appendix 1; STLC 
(1992). 
a Not full Working Party  
b Own choice not to be represented 
c PSASB representative 
obs Observer 
 
 
